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Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation 
Michael D. Kennedy and Ronald Grigor ~ u n y '  
Along with the rise of nationalism in the post-Cold War world has come an explosion of interest in and 
study of what "makes" the nation. Supplying their own answers to that difficult question, historians and social 
scientists have arrived at a broad consensus on the modernity and constructedness of nations, explicitly rejecting 
the concepts of nationalists who argue for antique origins and long continuities of their nations. Rather than the 
product of primitive or perennial cultural and social forces, or the inevitable result of capitalist relations of 
production, or simply an expression of an innate ethnic or linguistic essence, the nation has been reconceptualized 
as a community imagined by its members and leaders to require their primary allegiance -- within a larger 
discourse in which nations, built on the people and a notion of popular sovereignty, provide the justification of 
claims to national rights, statehood, and territory.' The nation as representative of the people has become in the 
twentieth century the principal form of legitimation of the state. But, "the fundamental problem," as Etienne 
Balibar has pointed out, 
is therefore to produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself 
continually as national community. Or again, it is to produce the effect of unity by virtue of 
which the people will appear, in everyone's eyes, "as a people," that is, as the basis and origin of 
political p o ~ e r . ~  
The production of the nation and its constituent people has been variously elaborated in theoretical and 
macrohistorical accounts, but increasingly the attempts to explain the emergence of the nation have focused 
attention on the work of state and intellectual  elite^.^ In her work on South Africa, for example, Anne McClintock 
has emphasized the inventedness of community in order more powerfully to demonstrate the "implications of labor 
and creative ingenuity, technology, and institutional power." 
Nations are elaborate social practices enacted through time, laboriously fabricated through the 
media and the printing press, in schools, churches, the myriad forms of popular culture, in trade 
unions and funerals, protest marches and uprisings.' 
In this volume we focus on those who, in nationalism studies themselves, appear to have the greatest 
agency in the shaping of national understanding, propagating the values of the nation, disciplining the people 
internally and enforcing the rules and boundaries of the constituent people. We focus on intellectuals. We do not 
agree that there has been "an excessive focus on the activitiesof nationalist intellectuals as opposed to what are 
arguably the two most important dramatis personae in any nationalist politics: state and society" (in the words of 
Mark ~e iss inger ) .~  Although we do not disregard the broad structural and discursive frameworks and social 
dynamics that provided the contest in which nations have been constructed or doubt that the popular exercise of 
nationalist visions and the utilization of national ideology by states has greater explicit social consequence, we are 
&ncerned here with the "quiet politics" (Beissinger's term) of nationalism that establishes the possibilities for 
what states and societies might do. In their contestation of the meaning of thenation intellectuals are 
disproportionately involved in such quiet politics. As individuals, and perhaps as a group, intellectuals, "those 
who create, distribute and apply culture'' in Seymour Martin Lipset's phrase,7 appear to have the greatest effect in 
their action, and the greatest autonomy in their actions. Intellectuals create different ideologies of national identity 
within a larger discursive universe of available materials. They do the imaginative ideological labor that brings 
together disparate cultural elements, selected historical memories, and interpretations of experiences, all the while 
silencing the inconvenient, the unheroic, and the anomalous. 
Writers on nationalism have longed appreciated the centrality of intellectuals to the emergence of national 
consciousness and political mobilization. For tho& who have thought of the nation as always with us, a real, 
natural given of social existence, intellectuals were those who articulated what was actually there but had remained 
hidden, the pervasive submerged presence of the national in conditions of unfreedom and undonsciousness. 
Intellectuals were enlighteners, liberators, the articulators of the national spirit that had to be revived, reborn, 
resurrected. For a more modernist group of theorists, like the influential Ernest Gellner, intellectuals were the 
articulators of necessary social processes without which industrial.society was inconceivable. They were the clerks 
who carried out the functions of mass education and skilled labor needed by the modem world with its complex 
division of labor. Intellectuals helped to create the cultural homogeneity that industrialism required. Allied to this 
functionalist analysis, other modernists saw intellectuals as rational actors, even cynical instrumentalists, prepared 
to employ the rhetoric of nationalism for personal or political gains. Nationalism was available to outbid 
competitors in the political arena by appealing beyond the material to the affective. But more suggestive has been 
the work of those scholars who have seen intellectuals, not merely as reflective of what esists, but as constitutive of 
the nation itself, active agents providing new visions and languages that project a new set of social, cultural, and 
political possibilities. Intellectuals here are the creators, not only of nationalisms, but of the more universal 
discourse of the nation, of the very language and universe of meaning in which nations become possible. Our 
volume is interested in both the intellectual articulation of available materials and the creative construction of new 
visions and understandings. But it is also interested in something more. Our essays investigate the ways in which 
intellectuals as a category are provisionally constituted in the context of emerging nations. We are also interested 
in what happens to intellectuals once the nation exists, particularly in the conflicted relationship of intellectuals to 
power. 
.By focusing on the mutual articulation of national discourses and intellectuals, we shift the typical 
historical focus of sociological studies of intellectuals. Most such studies emphasize the significance of mass 
higher education and technocratic governance in late capitalism or post-industrial society for the production of 
intellectuals and their in f l~ence .~  By focusing on the nation, we shift our historical eye to include the early 
industrial age and the beginnings of print capitalism, the moment when nations could become popular, and 
intellectuals might play a consequential role in refashioning the social imagination. 
By focusing on the nation, we also diminish the salience of oppositions or tensions important in other 
studies of intellectuals. The tension behveen function and power in studies of professionals, so important for those 
who debate the relative value of expertise and its use in domination: looms less large in discussions of nation- 
making. Knowledge and power are central to studies of intellectuals and the nation. For nationalists the conquest 
of state power is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to create the conditions for the nation to know itself better. 
Similarly, the tension between expertise and criticality, so important for those who debate the political 
responsibility of intellectuals, is typically resolved in nationalism studies either by condemning nationalist 
intellectuals for generating dangerous products or celebrating those who elaborate the meaning of one's own 
nation. 
When we put intellectuals in the center of attention, however, we are not treating nationalism as a simple 
instrumentalist practice in which elite interests, understood as relatively objective and timeless, determine action. 
In the era of nationalism, elite agents certainly operate within the discourse of the nation, utilizing national 
symbols and traditions, reinventing and redeploying them to realize their own desires and "interests" disguised as 
the "national interest." But a simple rational choice argument could neither capture the complex construction of 
interests themselves nor the constitution of the subjects who become the interest-bearers. Without denying that 
elites try to achieve their material and non-material "interests" in ways that can be formally modeled as a game, 
and acknowledging some sophisticated treatments of utility maximization in which both material and non-material 
goals are included, we rather see how interests themselves are constituted in changing historical and cultural 
contexts by actors. It is not that nationalism is not "useful" or "rational" in certain circumstances, but that it is also 
much more than useful and rational; it is also irrational, excessive, even self-destructive. And it is even more than 
that. Nationalism is a complex cultural field that deserves as much explanation as do the actors who are caught up 
in it. It is especially complex if we take as subject formations both the nation and the intellectual. 
Like Brubaker, we believe that decoupling the categories of the nation's practice and its analysis can 
facilitate the study of the nation in the variety of its f~rmations. '~ For instance, we cannot accept at face value 
claims that nations are reawakened or that nations mature, and we would rather see such invocations as discursive 
strategies that elevate the nation's legitimacy into unassailable and teleological social formations. Such an 
approach also resonates with a familiar position within the normative politics of intellectual practice. For many 
analysts of intellectual practice, nationalism can destroy intellectuality. It is not, however, altogether clear that 
standing outside the streams of history, in an analytical position that claims to be divorced from practice, affords 
better tools for explaining social transformations. " We believe, in the end, that articulation offers us a way to 
study intellectuals and the nation simultaneously. 
Articulation is our keyword, a word that is helpful precisely because it provides an important double 
meaning. A noun that implies expression, something intellectuals are obliged to do to fill their role, it also implies 
a measure of fit between a cultural product and the social environment which enables its production and makes that 
product consequential. We are focusing on intellectuals as actors, rather more than on their environment and the 
institutionalization of their ideas.12 We also focus on that close articulation between intellectual and nation, with 
the ways in which different kinds of intellectuals, and different kinds of nations, fit together. We have adopted a 
broad definition of intellectuals and explore the practices of intellectuals which are not so obviously "intellectual" - 
- kitchentable talk or languishing in prison, for instance. We are also interested in people who may not be 
credentialed as "intellectuals" but whose practice has consequences normally reserved to intellectuals. Indeed, the 
politics of intellectual definition is nowhere more apparent than in the claim about the relationship between 
intellectuals and nation. Intellectuals face a double risk when enveloped by the nation. On the one hand, as 
patriots they lose their credential as critical or independent intellectuals. On the other hand, as critical intellectuals 
questioning the very "authenticity" of the nation, they are either ignored, marginalized, or cast out altogether. The 
very investigation in which our authors (as intellectuals) are engaged is likely to draw hostility from "true" 
nationalists, as Katherine Verdery's autobiography in this volume suggests. 
This volume, then, is not only about the intellectual and the articulation of the nation, but also the 
articulation of two discursive fields of intellectual practice -- around the responsibility of intellectuals and around 
the making of nations -- which themselves have a limited fit with each other. The contest over what makes an 
intellectual is probably as vital as the dispute over the making of the nation, but those who have engaged in the 
discussion of the normative grounding of intellectual distinction have not usually investigated the nation. In this 
introductory essay we begin by reviewing how intellectuals have posed intellectual responsibility yet have either 
marginalized or negatively valorized the nation in the discussion. We then turn to investigate one form of 
intellectual activity -- the active participation of the intellectual in emancipato~y or oppositional politics, which has 
P the effect of not only further reducing the nation's significance but of aspiring to minimize the distinction of the 
intellectual from the masses. This choice, moreover, fails to engage seriously the notion that intellectuals might 
not only be distinct, but also occupy a location in power relations that produces privilege. In the next section, we 
consider the linkage of intellectuals to power, especially where some fraction of the intelligentsia has been defined 
as a "new class." The problem of intellectuals and the state, those within and without, was posed particularly 
harshly in the Soviet Bloc, where intellectual distinction was framed by regimes that sought to monopolize all 
social discourse. We ask how intellectual authority expanded or was constrained, how visions became 
transformative or reproductive, how the intellectual's life, and not just their practice, resonated with the popular, 
and how the intellectual distinction itself was reduced or elevated in significance by movements of transformation. 
In the final section, we attempt to illustrate the ways in which intellectuals brought the nation into being and how 
intellectuals have been conceived in the making of nations. 
THE NORMATIVE GROUNDING OF INTELLECTUAL DISTINCTION 
Intellectuals are their own harshest critics. Much of the literature on intellectuals (of course, written by 
intellectuals -- who else?) is ruthlessly critical of their social effects,13 but the normative grounding of that critique 
is not at all consistent. The foundational text is La trahison des clercs (1927) by Julien Benda (1867-1956), who 
argued that "thanks to the clerks" -- those "whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims" -- 
"humanity did evil for two thousand years, but honoured good."14 At the end of the nineteenth century the clerks, 
"who had acted as a check on the realism of the people began to act as its stimulators." Giving up their 
disinterested national pursuits of knowledge, they "began to play the game of political passions," primarily 
adhering to nationalism, xenophobia, and racism, while favoring particularism over universalism, the practical 
over the spiritual, tradition and custom over reason, the strong state, the collective over the individual, action over 
knowledge, and adapting political forms to the unsocial and bloody nature of human beings." Benda was writing 
at a time when he perceived the abandonment by intellectuals of dispassionate Reason and a willing acceptance of 
forms of irrationalism ranging from Bergsonism to Fascism and Bolshevism. He yearned for the critical free- 
thinking of such people as Socrates, Jesus, Spinoza, Voltaire, or his near contemporary Ernst Renan, "symbolic 
personages marked by their unyielding distance from practical  concern^."'^ 
In the next decade Karl Mannheim established the sociological foundations for this argument with his 
notion of intellectuals as being socially unattached and relatively classless. They lose their "intellectuality," he 
wrote, when they suspend doubt, to become politically effective" This general sociological turn was, of course, 
also inspired by political concerns. At about the same time Edward Shils, the Chicago sociologist of intellectuals 
and ideologies, was stimulated to undertake his lifelong studies by the negative example of American "fellow- 
travelers" and Communist intellectuals, as well as the "active mischief," "complaisant indifference or approval to 
ruin what might have been a decent society" of Weimar intellectuals. Shils divided intellectuals into those who 
oppose prevailing norms and those who work to maintain "order and continuity in public life."I8 The latter clearly 
have a role in the formation of national communities. Shils argues that 
by means of preaching, teaching, and writing, intellectuals infuse into sections of the population 
which are intellectual neither by inner vocation nor by social role, a perceptiveness and an 
imagery which they would otherwise lack. By the provision of such techniques as reading and 
writing and calculation, they enable the laity to enter into a wider universe. The creation of 
nations out of tribes, in early modem times in Europe and in contemporary Asia and Africa, is 
the work of intellectuals, just as the formation of the American nation out of diverse ethnic 
groups is partly the work of teachers, clergymen, and  journalist^.'^ 
From hls ~ery~definition f intellectuals -- as those distinct from the "laity" by their concern, not only with the 
immediate, but with more remote values -- Shils appreciates that intellectuals can both elaborate and develop the 
potentialities inherent in a "system of cultural values" and reject "the inherited set of values."20 While useful for 
elaborating how intellectuals work, his normative stance shapes profoundly how that work is to be evaluated. He is 
critical of their disruption of social solidarity, established tradition, and constituted authority and assumes a 
dedicated conservative opposition to the critical, oppositional inte~lectual.~' Of course, normative politics can 
move in the opposite direction. 
Alvin Gouldner finds precisely in the intellectuals' opposition to authority a normatively superior position. 
It is a universal class, if flawed, because "it subverts all establishments, social limits, and privileges, including its 
own ... (and) bears a culture of critical and careful discourse which is an historically emancipatory rat i~nal i ty ."~~ 
The critical intellectual gains authority by claiming it on the grounds of autonomous, ostensibly unself-interested 
rationality. The new intellectual class claims authority on the basis, not of force, violence, or even property, but of 
skill and science. The power of argument is juxtaposed to the argument from power. Nevertheless, in Gouldner's 
"new class" analysis, intellectuals remain a class whose interest disproportionately advantages them even as they 
seek knowledge.23 In his words, they are "a cultural bourgeoisie whd appropriates privately the advantages of an . 
historically and collectively produced cultural capital."24 Like any other class, its objective is "to increase its own 
share of the national product; to produce and reproduce the special social conditions enabling them to appropriate 
privately larger shares of the incomes produced by the special cultures they possess; to control their work and their 
work settings; and to increase their political power partly to achieve the foregoing."25 These alternative normative 
positions embodied by Shils and Gouldner reflect the cultural politics of the American academy for the last thirty 
'years, even if the tide has moved somewhat to the left over that time. 
In the thoroughly politicized context in which they'lived and worked, East European intellectuals could 
not have embraced such a Euro-American aversion to political engagementz6 in any other than a utopian way. 
Indeed, political engagement, especially over the national question, was the rule, rather than the exception, in 
Eastern ~ u r o p e . ~ ~  Even the East European revisionist challenge to Stalinist rule, exhausted after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968; might be understood as an attempt to transform Marsism and:communist rule into a more 
intellectually vital project." In all of these efforts, intellectuality, of which reason is its prominent expression, was 
the primary challenge to crude political practice. It was a refuge from the pseudo-politics of a monopolistic 
regime, a sanctuary from which a new politics'could be articulated even when actual political practice was 
precluded. As Kolakowski argued in 1972, when intellectuals fail to use reason to establish their political or moral 
position, they abandon their very identity as inte~lectuals.~~ 
This normative position is applied not only to intellectuals and communism but especially to the role 
played by intellectuals in the making of.nationalism and anti-Semitism. Miklos Molnar finds that nationalism 
"paralyzed the minds of intellectuals and ... the political culture of the Hungarian elite which seemed so promising 
in the nineteenth century came to suffocate and atrophy because of the static nature of Hungarian society."30 Leon 
Volovici demonstrates how the Romanian intellectual, central to the nation's definition, became more and more. . 
invested in the irrationalism of nationalism and "the latent perception of Jew. as alien" so that by 1937 no'Dreyfus 
affair was even imaginable.3' In his analysis, there was a "replacement of thinking by commitment, the exchange 
of the criterion of truth -- now in the service of mysticism and politics -- for myth, the repudiation of the intellect 
and the praise of ba rba r i~m."~~  
This theme is quite common in the wars of Yugoslav succession, but the arguments for where 
intellectuality lies are less clear cut. Consider how one anthropologist refers to the hope for western support: "even 
now some Croats are calling for a 'desert storm' operation to drive the occupiers from their soil, followed by the 
. . Bosnians who want air strikes on Serbian gunners and an end to the arms embargo that limits their capacity to 
fight Serbs. It is also not the first time that intellectuals have been vaporized, to be replaced by patriots. It is this 
sense of inevitability, of course, that politicians must have. They must create crisis so that the choice is to be loyal 
or disloyal, to be patriot or traitor, in order to achieve their own ends."33 By contrast, Stjepan Mestrovic argues that 
such a disengaged intellectuality as this has become a kind of blad voyeurism, and that many western intellectuals 
are simply 
In &me circumstances, then, intellectual responsibility has demanded a political engagement infused with 
reason. Where communism and fascism have ruled, apolitical intellectual responsibility was harder to imagine, 
much 1ess.practice. To refuse to submit to communist or fascist ideological doctrine was obviously a political stance 
and to submit was to refuse intellectual responsibility. But in the United States, intellectual responsibility could be 
constructed in opposition to political engagement entirely, based on ideologies of reason and science ostensibly 
devoid of  politic^.^' To make these assessments of responsibility were obviously normative engagements 
themselves. But in the USA and other places where hegemony is articulated through political pluralism, to refuse 
to practice politics could more plausibly be constructed as apolitical. This commitment to an apolitical science in 
the context of politi'cal pluralism led Parsons and others to vaunt professionals as the intellectual par excellence of 
modernity.36 
In the construction of such an intellectual, "politics" in the national or class sense could disappear. At 
least those sociologists and others charged to explain the profession could miss its national and class bearings. The 
normative could slide into a narrowly conceived occupational code of ethics and miss the way in which the 
profession itself is national or embedded in class. The apolitical professional could be viewed in a mirror of the 
sociologist's own ostensibly apolitical gaze. While there has been an exTensive critique of this political innocence 
by a long line of sociologists interested in the power and privilege of professions,37 most of these sociologists have 
focused rather exclusively on the occupational politics of professionals. When they have gone beyond the 
profession to consider the political, they typically did so to consider how national or class-based political conflicts 
affected the occupation's own professional projects.38 Recently, however, the discursive link between professional 
identity and the making of nations and empires has been explored. Mingcheng Lo has demonstrated how the 
internal contradictions of the professional project among Taiwanese physicians helps explain their trajectory from 
being the primary exponents of an independent Taiwanese nation in the 1920s to apolitical doctors during the 
1930s to, finally, imperial physicians during World War 1 1 . ~ ~  Indeed, it is one more reflection of the American 
national experience that intellectuals, or wen professionals, could be theorized as somehow only occupational or 
class beings and not themselves as embedded in the nation. 
While the relationship between the purely professional or scientific and the political has been increasingly 
problematized, the troubling relationship between the intellectual and the political remains. Professionals are, after 
all, manifestly political in their self-organization and reliance on the state for regulation.40 Intellectuals, by 
contrast, are constructed as potentially above politics, allowing their intellectuality to construct their response to 
politics even as they engage it. Habermas and those inspired by him seem to hold onto the hope embodied in the 
example of Heinrich Heine, who simultaneously remained autonomous from the contemporary politics of critical 
intellectuals but nonetheless engaged the politics of the day. But Habermas mainly uses that example and his 
philosophical elaboration of it to provide a normative grounding for the critique he emphasizes: the segmentation 
between intellectuals who become expert but not public (professionals narrowly construed), and the masses who 
remain public but not ~ri t ical .~ '  This problem, however, should not be approached so readily as a general 
condition of modernity. There are several alternative relationships between intellectuals and power in modernity. 
In China, intellectuals can draw on a tradition of 'remonstration' to be simultaneously intellectual and 
political. Although the particular confrontation in Tiananmen Square led to an initially more egalitarian dialogue 
and subsequently greater 'confrontation' than is traditional, its initial form was familiar. Intellectuals and students 
challenged the state and offered a different vision of what it means to be Chinese in a familiar historical 
repertoire.42 Remonstration is not an East European practice, but during late communism intellectuals sought a 
new strategy for critique that embraced the distinction between intellectuals and politics. 
While their Western critics were increasingly likely to be making the argument that intellectuals are 
always potentially political because they can neither understand fully the conditions nor consequences of their 
action, East Europeans sought to challenge the state-sponsored politicization of art and science by posing the 
distinction between knowledge and politics in a virtually utopian way. Jerzy Szacki, for instance, acknowledged 
the difficulty of being primarily responsible to one's own intellectual field and not to politics, but he nevertheless 
wished to consider just how the utopia of absolute cultural values could influence the cultivation of intellectual 
responsibility under co~nmunism.~~ Communism collapsed before the full implications could be considered but the 
volume in which Szacki's article appeared offered a remarkably interesting collection of views on how politics and 
r intellectual responsiblity should ~ o m i n g l e . ~ ~  
Of course, a substantial segment followed Benda to argue that intellectuals must remain distinct and 
follow their own particular codes of responsibility. As Plato would have it, or as Benda argued, the treason of 
intellectuals is to abandon the commitment to a superior and ever more cultivated universalistic reason.45 Others 
argue that an intellectual's primary responsibility is to the craft, a textual responsibility, and one abandons 
intellectual responsibility when one violates that code of textual re~ponsibility.~~ Indeed, intellectual responsibility 
is most apparent when moral action is conducted through modes of intellectual practice, rather than in explicitly 
political engagement. But even with that intellectual craft, intellectuals cannot be relieved of political or moral 
responsibility since it can, and must, be practiced within their field.47 For these authors, then, intellectuals have a 
different kind of political responsibility, perhaps even an elevated one; but one that is to be kept separate from 
popular politics. Ernest Gellner, however, offers caution by arguing that it is frankly difficult to recognize 
intellectual treason when any conclusion is reached by intellectual means; perhaps the greatest treason is to easily 
identlfy others who are guilty.48 
On the other hand, several of the authors emphasized that one cannot separate very easily intellectual 
responsibility from a more general political responsibility. For instance, the defense of truth seeking cannot be 
limited to intellectual affairs, since the real world impinges on those intellectual affairs, and truth seeking is not 
only the province of intellectuals, but is the province of all actors.49 Indeed, intellectuals have more responsibility 
than ever before, given that technological prowess now threatens not only human communities but the biophysical 
world itself." Another author, however, argues that to submerge one's intellectuality into a political position can be 
intellectually responsible if it is a strategy realized through intellectual means. Expertise cannot be neutral and is 
rather connected to the values one embraces which might require political engagement." 
East Europeans were more likely to emphasize that intellectuality should be separated from power, and 
West Europeans were more likely to emphasize this impossibility. In part this was because communism, as a 
system, sought to contain intellectuals, to coopt them, and through that lead them to abandon intellectual 
re~ponsibility.~~ To adopt the liberal position of intellectuals remaining apart from politics was a means of 
preserving that intellectual responsibility in late communism. This tendency of emphasizing intellectual autonomy 
was, however, more difficult to maintain before the politics of the nation. Jerzy Jedlicki argued that despite the 
protests of liberal intellectuals, one cannot be responsible only for oneself. One must also address collective 
responsibility for a nation's past. As the nation is socially constructed, so is collective responsibility for its 
heritage. The obligation to assume that collective responsibility is as real as is the nation.s3 In this regard, he says, 
historians have a special role. "The historian's conscious and subconscious choices of topics and interpretations 
may make people remember what ought to be remembered, or may help them to forget the events they do not like 
to think about."54 
Although it is impossible to resolve these profound theoretical differences about intellectual responsibility, 
one point of departure for those interested in developing a normative theory of intellectual distinction would be to 
. , adopt a more Gramscian position. Here a normative theory of intellectual responsibility is replaced with a theory 
of intellectuals embedded in a larger account of social transformation. For Gramsci and those who follow him, the 
question then is how to become an effective oppositional inte~lectual.~~ Proximity to power is never a problem for 
Gramsci, for it is inevitable. The "taint" of power is not something to avoid, for far more relevant is where you 
stand. 
INTELLECTUALS AND OPPOSITION 
If the institutions that authorize and empower intellectuals are relatively "legitimate" and present 
themselves as neutral and disinterested, like France's Ecole Nationale dYAdministration, England's Oxford or 
Cambridge, America's Haward or Yale, it is more likely that the politicized intellectual can be denied their status 
as intellectuals. By contrast, where national liberation movements define the trajectory of younger generations, 
intellectuals are likely to move from movements to ministerial office after the revolution. They must be politicized. 
In Russia, China, Vietnam, and elsewhere, revolutionary movements have been an effective conduit from the 
margins of society into the state. Likewise, the social mobilizations that transformed Soviet-type societies in the 
late 1980s, notably in those places with developed civil societies, propelled intellectuals into explicitly political 
roles in postcommunist reg~mes,'~ with Vaclav Have1 as the supreme exemplar. Clearly, then, the articulation of 
intellectuals and political engagement is shaped by the larger discursive field in which they are embedded, and the 
degree to which the dominant institutions are contested by those out of power. 
In the intellectual politics of transformation, Gramsci is usually taken as the point of departure. Gramsci 
has most usefully distinguished between traditional intellectuals "whose position in the interstices of society has a 
certain interclass aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an 
attachment to various historical class formations," and organic intellectuals, who might serve any function, are 
"the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social cla~s".~' As Geoff Eley reminds us of 
Gramsci's call for developing organic intellectuals of the Left: "Any social group that aspires to cast or recast 
society in its own image must be capable of generating its own organic intellectuals capable of exercising moral 
leadership and of winning over a significant proportion of existing traditional intellectuals; for otherwise the 
dominant meanings and understandings in society cannot be conte~ted ."~~ 
Following in many ways both Benda and Gramsci, Edward Said has put forth his own program for the 
public role of the intellectual, that of the "outsider, 'amateur,' and disturber of the status quo."Sg For Said, 
intellectuals are "precisely those figures whose public performances can neither be predicted nor compelled into 
some slogan, orthodox party line, or fixed dogma." "Nothing disfigures Ule intellectual's public performance as 
much as trimming, careful silence, patriotic bluster, and retrospective and selfdramatizing apostasy." Said 
distinguishes, then, between intellectuals as critical, subversive outsiders who "speak the truth to power," and 
supportive insiders who promote special interests, "patriotic nationalism, corporate thinking, and a sense of class, 
racial or gender ~ r i v i l e ~ e . " ~ '  
Said defines an intellectual as "an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, 
articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public."62 This definition 
works for the academic as well as the president of the republic. The intellectual is more than a thinker -- all 
, - ,  - human beings think. Intellectuals have an essentially public role in which they use their intellect and intellectual 
skills to some public end. Some engage in the unmasking of oppression and exploitation; others generate the 
mystifications that allow existing power relations to flourish. 
This approach, however, assumes away the challenge of recognizing what is public and what is not and 
also takes for granted that the products are intellectual if they are produced by those who are credentialled so. It 
- does not question how the credentialling takes place. Moreover, it takes a profoundly intellectual location to be 
able to recognize which products are intellectual and which are not and which products are contributing to the 
masking of power and which are unmasking it. In short, even in this self-evident definition, the power and 
limitations of intellectuals radiate: their power to define distinction, including their own,63 but only at the expense 
of hiding other problems. And very often, although not always, these accounts underplay the problem of the 
nation. 
All intellectuals, given the fatality of language and the necessity of citizenship in the modem world, are 
"nationed". Contingently, at least, they have a national identity, and their practices may have important 
consequences for the nation. Intellectuals sometimes take up the most fundamental roles in the definition of the 
nation, being charged with "building" the nation, or perhaps even "destroying" it. Said clearly has a preferred role: 
"With regard to the conknsus on group or national identity it is the intellectual's task to show how the group is not 
a natural or God-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history 
of struggle and conquest behind it, that it is sometimes important to represent." The dilemma for this approach, of 
course, is to challenge one of the most important resources of a national identity: the power which comes from 
claims of antique origins or divine fates. Spealung truth to power may involve challenging the power of the 
community one seeks to empower. 
One need not begin from a Marxist or post-Marxist foundation to adopt a similar position on a politicized 
intellectual's responsibility for speaking truth to power and practicing a national politics that is inclusive or 
expansive. One of the most potent examples of a theorist of and practitioner in a politics that emphasizes the 
engaged role of intellectuals is Vaclav Havel. Although all individuals are enjoined to develop their own personal 
morality and responsibility to resist ideology's destruction of both life and environment, in Havel's view 
intellectuals, as those leadng in the elaboration of human consciousness, have a special role. As he argued to the 
US Congress shortly after the East European Revolutions of 1989, "If the hope of the world lies in human 
consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the 
world, hiding their distaste for politics under the alleged need to be Unlike Gramsci and Said, 
Havel begins from a much more individualist and spiritual normative foundation. Personal reason, humility and 
dignity are the basis for resistance to communism and other ideologically dominated forms of life.65 Without 
defining a set of power relations in which some individuals or groups are clearly aligned with power and others 
clearly aligned with emancipation, Havel's theory of intellectual politics rests more coinfortably with traditional 
approaches to intellectuals and their normative distinction. If intellectuals are only obliged to articulate "truth" 
and not to empower collectivities, Havel does not face the same dilemmas as Gramsci and Said. He need not 
question whether he must compromise his intellectuality for its social effect. Ethics are his principal guide, not 
social change. 
Havel, Said and Gramsci, all exemplary intellectuals, nevertheless, illustrate a similar resolution of the 
relationship between the politics of intellectual responsibility and of the nation. While embracing their nation, 
they do so on grounds that are more "universal," whether in an embrace of liberal respect for human rights, or in a 
philosophy of history committed to general emancipation. The nation is not foregrounded in their philosophy. 
In general, nationalism is presented as the intellectual's nemesis. Indeed, it is relatively rare to find those 
who would write first about intellectual responsibility to engage the nation positively and prominently. Of course, 
within national historiographies intellectuals are lauded because they struggle to release and elaborate their nation. 
But here the narrative of intellectual responsibility is subordinated to the narrative of the nation's trajectory. With 
this collection, we hope to stimulate more discussion about the politics of intellectual responsibility that neither 
distances the nation nor is subordinated to it. We can suggest this direction of discussion by identifying one recent, 
and exemplary, effort within this problematic. 
The celebrated Hungarian theorist of anti-politics, Gyorgy Konrad, has recently fised his gaze on the 
nation in fear of the growth of anti-Communist fascism. Rather than condemn nationalism as inherently exclusive, 
Konrad recommends to his fellow nationals that the Hungarian nation be reconceived as a project rather than an 
identity, and as one that is open to esternal influences, rather than closed off from them. He writes: 
The self-shrinking national strategy takes what it considers non-national and delights in , 
condemning it. The selfexpanding national strategy takes anything from the outside world that 
can be fruitfully related to what was previously considered national and delights in integrating 
the two.66 
As he proposes a reconception of the nation, he also writes from a remarkably confident position, eager to see the 
expansion of the nation's meaning, rather than its consolidation. That is certainly a strategy for articulating the 
making of nations and of intellectual practice, but it also has the potential for reinforcing the gap between those 
globally oriented citizens and those unable to partake, for whatever reason, of this international access. It opens the 
door for the critique, once again, of intellectual privilege and dare we say it, cosmopolitanism. And it also treats 
the global as rather benign, or at least subject to intellectually responsible selection, rather than to the nation's 
subversion. 
For most postcolonial accounts, the global is by no means so benign. In his accounts of India's 
nationalism, for instance, Partha Chatte jee  explores how even nationalism, that which is supposed to be the 
property of a nation, is conceived within a global framework that undermines the indigenousness of Indian 
expression. 67 HOW can one articulate an-emancipatory politics in the frame of one's own community when that 
frame, the nation, is not an indigenous cultural form but one gradually appropriated from the colonizers by Indian 
intellectuals and leaders? Part of the problem for India, he argues, is that one is resisting the domination of 
Europeans within the problematic of European creation. Part of the solution is to develop a different kind of 
r - -  ..-. methodology that searches for the community that a European imperialism has destroyed. East Europeans, by 
contrast, rarely find such a dilemma or need to unpack European imperialism from their own national projects. 
They have another kind of imperialism in the forefront of their mind. 
-. ...- Those escaping communisin are also likely to see their movement as one away from empire, from a kind 
a[ - of imperialism which many East European liberals and/or nationalists see as far more destructive of community 
than global capitalism: In radical distinction from many postcolonial positions like that of Chatterjee, community 
might be found alongside global capital. Konrad's own fusion of liberalism and nationalism suggests just such an 
emancipatory hope. 
The comparison between such different kinds of postcolonial expressions as Konrad and Chatte jee 
suggest just how powerfully Soviet imperialism, as much as global capitalism, has shaped the construction of the 
nation and global capitalism. The differences are profound, but the similarities are intriguing too. In both cases, 
the nation is being reconceived as something which must be constructed and made along lines which are not 
already given. And here, the intellectual becomes absolutely central whether in facilitating a nation's adaptation 
to an external world, or in search of that which global forces have destroyed. 
These various examples -- from Benda to Gramsci and Said to Have1 -- make it clear that any account of 
the relationship of intellectuals to power, to the nation, to the state, or to society is implicated in a complicated 
cultural politics informed by the case at hand. In some cases, the independence of intellectuals from politics is 
celebrated, while in others it is identified as irresponsibility. Sometimes, intellectuals are praised for their devotion 
to the nation, while in other cases, their devotion is devalued as irrational mysticism. If the politics are shared, 
whether revolutionary Marxist, nationalist or liberal democratic, the analyst is likely to celebrate the responsibility 
of political intellectuals; if the politics are opposed, hdshe is likely to identify intellectuals as having lost their 
identity. Regardless, the Gramscian point is fundamental: intellectuals are invaluable to refashioning a nation, 
especially when that goes beyond rearticulating existing forms, as Konrad and Chatte jee  recommend. .Equally 
fundamental, however, is that intellectual indispensability and the political definition of responsibility cannot 
address that basic sociological question of the relationship between intellectuals and power. r 
INTELLECTUALS AND POWER 
This transformation of intellectual roles -- from leaders or advisors of social movements to those with state 
author& and power -- invites consideration of intellectuals as a separate class or social group. Nationalist 
ideology makes little room for this kind of question, but certainly Marxism and populism have long made this a 
central object of inquiry, especially around the question of whether intellectuals form a "new class". To see 
intellectuals as a "new class" seeking or achieving power asks whether their particular "interests," either in terms 
of the valuation of intellectual labor over manual labor or in terms of alternative discursive.frames -- the culture 
of critical discourse69 or the culture of rational discour~e'~ privilege intellectuals over others. This problematic is 
commonly pursued in class analysis but relatively rarely in studies of social movements or nationalism. Here we 
explore how theories of nation formation might be affected by a new class approach, and how the new class 
Lz;~  approach might be transformed if we consider how the articulation of the nation is connected to intellectual 
privilege. 
Michel Foucault, in his many essays linking knowledge and power, notably, in "Truth and Power," is one 
=.- - *- who questions the role of intellectuals by laying out the limiting and particular claims of putatively general or 
= .  universal intellectua~s.~~ "For a long period," he writes, "the 'left' intellectual spoke and was acknowledged the 
right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice. He was heard, or purported to make himself heard, 
as the spokesman of the universal. To be an intellectual meant something like being the consciousness/conscience 
of us all."72 He finds that over time, such general intellectuals become less capable of claiming universal 
consequence. With the development of science and its extension to all domains of material and social life, the 
"specific intellectual" with a particular rather than general expertise eventually eliminates the general intellectual's 
claims to relevance. At the same time, the specific intellectual becomes closer to the masses as they are both 
confronted by the same adversaries and have the same material concerns. Although Foucault does not say it, the 
main domain left for general intellectuals could be in articulating the nation. But following Foucault, this 
ambition might be analyzed with attention to very specific lineages and circuits of power.73 
Pierre Bourdieu also has analyzed intellectuals in terms of his more general theory of fields, where each 
set of engagements is constituted by particular forms of capital and strategies of action. In this approach, rather 
than being obliged to define intellectuals in terms of some familiar theory of class, one considers each site of 
activity in terms of the-relationship between the specific forms of capital circulating in a particular field of activity 
which is mediated by particular forms of habitus. He claims that intellectuals, and sociologists in particular, 
typically focus on their relationship to politics and power but outside the particular kinds of power relations which 
constitute their own-field of activity. So, instead of beginning an analysis of intellectuals and movements by 
assessing their relationship, one should begin with the field of power relations in which intellectuals are operating, 
and ask how the 'aesthetic dimension of political conduct matters to intellectuals" or how the university or a 
discipline is connected to the political fields existing outside of it.74 Indeed, in his call for a reflexive sociology, 
one of the first objects of scrutiny should be one's own field of action. This means, then, that we must be far more 
specific about the category of intellectuals we invoke: clearly historians are different from physicians who are 
different from engineers in their relation to the nation. This then, is a different picture of intellectuals: rather than 
begin their analysis once they hit the political field, Bourdieu suggests we begin their political analysis within the 
field of relations with specific forms of capital that are appropriate to their own stakes of advance and loss. 
One of the more thorough applications and elaborations of Bourdieu's theory is found in Katherine 
Verdery's Verdery portrays in exquisite detail why national discourse becomes so central in the cultural 
productions of Romanian state socialism, and why intellectuals are so important. She argues that national 
identity's meaning, so important in Romanian discourse for a long time before-communist rule, becomes even 
more significant in Romania when the Communist Party opted to control society through coercive and 
, symbolic/ideological controls more than remunerative ones. Intellectuals become significant because the invisible 
forms of domination Western societies manage through surveillance, manipulation and disciplining are radically 
+ . underdeveloped in communist led societies, and thus the more explicit control over what is said by whom makes 
intellectuals crucial as both propagandist and threat.76 The intellectuals' own milieu, Verdery argues, also 
contributes to making the nation ever more significant. In their own contest for resources, intellectuals use various 
.- = . images of the nation to situate themselves, and their particular claims for the allocation of resources from the 
center. In this process entirely derived from the rules and resources of their own intellectual fields, intellectuals . 
elevate the overall centrality of the nation in public discourse. The West also elevated the nation in Romania and 
among its intellectuals 
The West's emphasis on Ceausescu's "maverick status among communist authorities encouraged this 
national discourse. The West simply did not support an internal opposition as they did in "entrepreneurial" 
Hungary or "brave" ~ o l a n d . ~ ~  The Western articulation of the meaning of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian 
nations shaped profoundly how the state, nation and civil society would be understood under communism and 
after. Even with communism's collapse and a wish to return to Europe, the possibility for democracy and 
pluralism replacing the discourse of the Romanian nation appeared slim in the first half of the 1990s. That 
changed in 1996, but Western definitions of the Romanian nation remain profoundly important in shaping its own 
internal discourse, as promises of inclusion in NATO and the European Union shape the liberal hope. 
To be sure, therefore, inteilictuals are not the only ones that shape the nation. We do find, however, that 
Verdery's work is exemplary: to understand the intellectual articulation of the nation, one must examine particular 
fields of action within which specific intellectuals work, as well as those more global conditions which shape how 
that work is to be received. Beginning with an intellectual field, however, skips over one of the most profound 
implications of Gramsci's work. 
Gramsci argued that intellectuals have no particular distinction, and that all people are intellectuals 
though they do not always have that funct i~n. '~ Defining intellectuals by existing fields of social relations 
overlooks how intellectuals might be made in milieus defined as anti-intellectual or non-intellectual by those who 
rule. One of the best illustrations of this problem of identifying who is, and who is not, an intellectual can be 
found in the 1980-8 1 Solidarity movement. In that movement, the intellectual role was "crystallized" in the form 
of the "expert." But many activists were as "intellectual," in terms of degrees of education or social imagination, 
as the experts themselves; intellectuals had adopted both roles as suitable to their own influence. Co-authors of the 
famous "Open Letter to the Party," Jacek Kuron and Karol ~ o d z e l e w s k i ~ ~  were on opposite sides of the role divide, 
with the former serving as advisor and expert, the latter as political activist. Where was the intellectual 
operating?' 
More generally, the creation of women'ss' and New Social ~ o v e m e n t s ~ ~  illustrates that distinguishing 
the "intellectual" is anachronistic in postmodem cultural AS activists become more informed and 
educated, and as activists-emphasize everyday life, as opposed to the grander claims of history and culture in most 
nationalist movements, 84 traditional claims to intellectual distinction diminish. Access to "meaning" is not so 
difficult to reach, in terms either of consumption or production. At least the traditional credentials of recognizing 
"intellectual" are not so essential.85 The primary intellectual challenge in post-modem movement politics is to 
- -. "identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action" and then "identify the conditions in 
which a relation of subordination becomes a relation of oppression, and therefore constitutes itself into the site of 
an antagonism."86 The task of the intellectual in such movements is to rely on everyday life and a deep, 
c %. "organic," understanding of the popular classes. Here the distinctions among intellectual, activist and participant 
can become difficult indeed to draw. 
- Claims to intellectual authority in one domain are also difficult to transfer to another. Some kinds of 
knowledge are restricted to the area of a particular intellectual's claims to authority. For instance, physicians are 
permitted to make claims about the health of abocly but but may not be authorized to speak about.the health of a 
nations7 Or even more profoundly; when can those without any particular credentials challenge those with 
ultimate credentials, as when peace activists challenge those with military power over the definition of national 
security?' Political sympathies obviously influence the accreditation of expertise too. During the Cold War leftist 
intellectuals critical of various aspects of American foreign policy were completely marginalized, excluded from 
decision-making circles, ostensibly because they were "committed" politically or even "disloyal," at a time when 
their ideological opponents on the Right were acceptable as.value-free, or perhaps uncritically loyal, intellectual 
"experts." Suny was made particularly aware of this exclusion by his subsequent inclusion in such discussions at 
the time of the Soviet collapse, when ideological confusion and shaken confidence in ruling circles created an 
ecumenical opening. That opening, however, may not last as ideological forces realign and reconstruct new 
barriers to influence. 
Challenges to the articulation of the nation come not only in conflicts between movements and state, but ' 
within social movements too. Janet Hart, for instance, has introduced a powerful argument about the relationship 
between the elaboration of a national movement in Greece, and its transformation by women into a movement 
whose nation had new voices.89 World War I1 provided the political opportunity for women in the left wing EAM 
to transform gender regimes. The EAM was not, however, a feminist movement, though a women's movement 
existed within the larger movement, reconstructing gender relations in the EAM and in the broader imagination of 
how the nation was gendered. 
The transformation of gender relations fits with modernist narratives on progressiveness in education and 
a belief in personal autonomy or self improvement, but it gained its power by becoming embedded within a kind of 
Greek nationalism, articulated before the Axis invasion by a series of progressive intellectuals, beginning with 
those in the Demotic movement aiming to popularize Greek language. This emphasis continued later with 
Demetrius Glinos and others who sought to link education and the women question. Hart argues that without this 
opening by intellectuals, pressure from women for the transformation of gender relations could neither have been 
made nor be as successful as it was. The defensive nationalism that was developed to resist the Axis not only drew 
upon, then, the need for women to forget their "proper" gender roles and defend the nation but was merged with a 
political nationalism that extended citizenship rights and equality to the subaltern, to women. Although this 
r ideology and praxis were still rooted in masculinist narratives, women's subsequent mobilization in the EAM 
transformed these activists' sense of themselves, and enabled them to resist the postwar Greek authorities' attempts 
sf at forced confessions in the prisons of Averoff and elsewhere. While intellectuals provided the opening, women 
activists on the ground completed the translation and transformed their own sense of women's rights and 
I responsibilities. While we can easily attribute great intellectual innovation and consequence to those with 
.%, authorial recognition and power, like Glinos, we must recognize the qualities of intellectuality in those, like the - women whose histories Hart depicts, whose voices are hard to hear. In theorizing intellectuals it is essential to 
- - . move beyond the matter of what elite intellectuals write and consider the institutional spaces available in any 
society for "free intellectual activity" and the particular products associated with that work." 
In addition to seeking intellectual activity among those deemed non-intellectual, it is also i k r t a n t  to 
consider the mundane worlds of intellectuals themselves in order to consider how their distinction articulates with 
their commonality. Indeed, it seems that to consider that world of the eveqday, we might more clearly identify the 
conditions under which intellectuals become organic. Even while the Russian rntelligenty have never failed to 
speak on the nation's behalf, Jane Burbank has argued that their historic connections to autocracy and elitism led 
to their failure during perestroika and after to generate the popular counterculture Gra~nscians would advise. Their 
culture of entitlement, their confidence in commitments rather than pragmatic politics, and their inattention to the 
public itself were the source, she believes, for their failure as organic intel~ectuals.~' A view from the kitchen table 
suggests a different account. 
Nancy Ries argues that Moscow intellectuals in their publicly prominent role could articulate the 
liminality of opposition to perestroika but could not transform politics more fundamentally because of their real 
link to society. By examining their informal talk and everyday life, she identifies the commonality of genres 
between talk at the kitchen table and in the public sphere. Both tended to invoke litanies of what was wrong with 
everyday life and the entire system. Both tended to portray the problem in moral, folkloric terms -- the inadequacy 
of superiors and the victim's moral superiority in suffering -- rather than in terms of systemic organization and 
rational political change. Solutions also were posed in these mythicaYmoral terms, dependent either on the saint 
for breaking out of the cycle of absurdities and resistance through victimhood's validation, or absolutely utopian 
demands unrelated to what might be realized. 92 Kitchen table talk was transported into politics, which in turn 
assured the reproduction of old forms of power.93 
Organic intellectuals ought therefore to be considered not only in terms of their intellectual articulation 
with the subaltern, but also in the ways their mundane lives articulate with the popular and their visions articulate 
with the transformative. One ought to consider where their intellectuality is consequential and how new 
engagements with the popular transform intellectual articulations, as Hart's work has suggested. One ought also to 
consider how intellectuals transfer their claims to competence beyond the spheres in which authorities credential 
their expertise, as Kennedy has suggested, and examine the conditions under which those authorities exclude 
claims to competence, as Suny's experience with American foreign policy has suggested. One ought to consider 
how intellectuals' fields of action articulate with larger political fields, as Verdery has elaborated, but also consider 
how intellectuals are in fact identified as such and distinguished from others, as Kurczewski's work on Solidarity 
and those involved in contemporary identity politics illustrate. 
INTELLECTUALS AND NATION MAKING 
We have tried to suggest that intellectuals are best defined, not by their intrinsic qualities or selfdefined 
+ ,. role (whch can be supportive or subversive or power), but by their social position, their relationship to most 
i :' people, the non-intellectuals, from whom they would distinguish themselves. As Zygmunt Bauman reconstructs 
4 . .  their early history, these heirs of les uhilosouhes of the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment played a key role in the 
transference of the pastoral role of the Church to the secular, tutelary state.94 With the emergence of the modern 
state, Bauman goes on, legislators, including intellectuals, carried out the functions of disciplining, repressing, 
educating, training the people. Bauman's negative valence here is reminiscent of Foucault. Intellectuals 
"inherited the image of 'the people' as it had been construed by the political action of the absolutist state. It had 
been constructed as a problem for, simultaneously, repressive measures and social policy."9S With the constitution 
of "the people," it was but a short step to link that community with aspects of culture, language, or shared religion, 
"customs" or myths, to create that most "invented" of communities, the nation. 
The thrust of much recent scholarship on nation-formation has stressed how nationalism preceded the 
nation. In Eric J. Hobsbawm's succinct formulation: "[N]ationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make 
states and nationalisms but the other way round."% This scholarly turn in the work of such theorists as Elie 
Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch, and Benedict Anderson has had the effect of confirming 
the role of intellectuals. "One factor," writes Anthony D. Smith succinctly, ''W appear to be a necessary 
condition of all nationalist movements ... -- the role of the intelligent~ia.~~ Particularly in the work of 
modernization theorists, like Gellner and Karl Deutsch, nationalism is seen to arise from a new form of education 
or technology that creates both the intelligentsia and the media through which intellectuals are able to reach a 
newly-literate mass audience. 
Gellner argues that modernization, which for him subsumes industrialization, erodes traditional agrarian 
societies and.replaces "structure," the older system of role relationships, with "culture," a new form of identity that 
becomes equivalent to nationality. To be a member of the new community requires literacy and a minimal 
technical competence. This in turn demands a mass educational system that integrates subgroups into a single 
national community. But because this occurs unevenly across the globe and through society, modernization leads 
to class competition and the exclusion of some from the community. Nationalist intellectuals lead movements of 
national secession with the support of the excluded lower classes. For Gellner, though constructed, the nation is 
not a subjective choice but a matter of "genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recogni~ed."~' 
Unlike agrarian society, Gellner argues, industrial society requires a national educational and communications 
system, a state, and "the kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationa~ism."~~ As we noted above, for all h s  
apparent emphasis on intellectuals, Gellner's argument is properly criticized for its functionalism, in which 
nationalism is made to play an essential role in the making of industrial society, and its lack of agency in the 
synthesis of the discourse of the nation. As must already be clear, our volume seeks to bring the creative, 
constitutive role of intellectuals, the key agents in generating and propagating nationalism and the discourse of the 
nation, back to the center of the nation-making effort. 
The first and most successful ideas that nationalist intellectuals expounded were that nations were the 
natural units into which humanity is divided and that these units were culturally unique. From these "facts" 
followed a series of political claims: that the nation is the highest loyalty of "man," a clear challenge to earlier 
god-centered political legitimations; that political power ought to reside in "the people" constituted as "the nation;" ' 
that nations have primary claims over the piece of territory, that is, their "homeland;" and that nations must be 
recognized and institutionalized in their own states. In this nationalist vision, it was only in the nation-state, the 
highest stage of history, that the essence of humans was restored and allowed to develop in freedom. As Smith 
summarizes the "core doctrine," "nationalism fuses three ideals: collective self-determination of the people, the 
expression of national character and individuality," and finally the vertical division of the world into unique 
nations each contributing its special genius to the common fund of Left unspecified, however, are 
all the important matters of what constitutes the nation, its character and qualities, its boundaries and membership. 
That selection and privileging of the elements by which a given nation will be known -- and know itself -- has 
historically been the foundational role of patriotic and nationalist intellectuals. As Smith explains, 
Nationalists aim to construct nations out of populations that lack, in varying degrees, a sense of 
identity and purpose, or are ethnically heterogeneous, economically backward and socially 
divided. They provide often elaborate and sophisticated analyses and programmes for communal 
regeneration and collective decision-making. They must often build up from nothing the whole 
apparatus of the sovereign state and instill a sense of group dignity through the creation of an 
autonomous system of education and culture .... Turning a social grouping into a 'nation' 
exercising sovereignty in its own 'nation-state' is a taxing and agonising task, 'but it is also a 
positive and constructive one, a challenge to man."'' 
Theorists and historians of nationalism have often noted that nationalism has been most powerful as a 
mobilizing ideology at moments of revolutionary instability, often during or following wars, as in the French 
revolutionary era (1789-1815), the revolutions of 1848-1852), the aftermath of World Wars I and 11, and the 
revolutionary transformations of statist "socialist" regimes at the end of the Cold War. It is then argued that in a 
context of instability, insecurity, and unpredictability, intellectuals and politicians search for or choose the 
available forms of community to recreate a degree of stability and certainty. lo* But here too an overly simple 
functionalist explanation loses the complex sense of creativity that comes together in generating nationalisms. The 
initial generation of the nationalist synthesis m e  from Enlightenment intellectuals, like the Germans Fichte and 
Herder, who married an affection for ethnic culture and tradition with a project of progress and enlightenment and 
in the process transformed the understanding of the solidarities that made up the community. 
Perhaps the quintessential early national patriot, or "historicist intellectual" (in Smith's phrasing), was 
Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), the Baltic German literary scholar who inspired generations of his 
countrymen and others to investigate the creative function of language. In praise of Homer and Shakespeare, 
Herder proclaimed "A poet is the creator of the nation around him, he gives them a world to see and has their souls 
in his hand to lead them to that world." In search of the soul of the nation, Herder collected his people's folk 
songs, read Norse poetry and mythology, and analyzed the prose of Martin Luther. Language was for Herder 
intimately connected to culture and community, the medium through which humans understood and thought, were 
j . conscious and able to express their inner selves. "Language expresses the collective experience of the group," he 
. wrote.'03 Through language people understand that they share a culture and historical tradition and therefore form 
a people W k ) :  Rather than biological or racial unity, the nation for Herder was a matter of shared awareness of 
the social milieu into which one is born. This shared culture is, in the words of his translator, the "proper 
foundation for a sense of collective political identity." '04 
Herder contrasted the particularity of the nation and its Volk~eist o the universalistic rationality of the 
French Enlightenment. Yet, as Isaiah Berlin has noted, he was at the same time a creature of the Enlightenment, 
explaining his own philosophy of histo-ry in naturalistic and scientific terms. Nature (or God) created the plurality 
of languages and cultures, or, as Berlin puts it, "A nation is made what it is by 'climate', education, relations with 
its neighbours, and other changeable and empirical factors, and not by an impalpable inner essence or an 
unalterable factor such as race or c o l ~ u r . " ' ~ ~  At the, same time Herder's love of nations did not extend to the state. 
He despised government and power, the great absolutist monarchs of his time, and celebrated the cleansing force of 
the French Revolution. His Nationalismus, a word he apparently created, was cultural rather than political, and 
Berlin claims Herder as the ancestor, not of political or statist nationalism, but of all forms of populism. However 
he might be characterized, Herder, like his contemporary and successive historicist intellectuals, was a unique, 
often isolated figure, who pioneered the "recovery" of the cultural and national past. 
An East European pioneer in theorizing the link between the intellectual and labor, Stanislaw Brzozowski 
(1878-191 l), brought a more "nationed" argument to a subsequently elaborated "Grarnscian" position where 
intellectuals are seen as central in the class struggle against those who rule. In his "Marxist" phase, Brzozowski 
argued that the working class ought to lead the national struggle; when they did not, it was a sign of social 
disintegration. The intelligentsia, he argued, should facilitate the development of the intellectual life of the 
working class "by creating a culture which would express and develop the potential spiritual richness inherent in 
the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt) of the workers." The intelligentsia, according to Bnozowski, fulfills its mission only 
in alliance with the working class, as this proletariat realizes its conscious and purposeful control over labor.'06 
Brzozowski subsequently abandoned his anthropocentric theory of labor for a more nationalist and 
spiritualist position, one which finds the deepest source of the collective subconscious in the fatherland (oiczvzna), 
by which he understood family structure, material production, and statehood with military organization as the 
'material' side, with language and the nation as the subjective dimension of this fatherland.I0' While Brzozowski 
never abandoned the working class as the agent of Poland's future entirely, he believed in this last phase that the 
intelligentsia had to return to the Catholic Church, which he thought potentially transformed into the 'organ of 
will of working people, while preserving its historical contin~ity". '~~ Nations become the "deepest reality" for 
humanity and a "necessary form of truth," while labor, even if humanity's universal experience, could not be its 
ultimate f o u n d a t i ~ n . ' ~  
The social role of nationalist intellectuals was codified by Miroslav Hroch in his very useful periodization 
of nationalism. Phase A begins when patriotic scholars, like Herder, initiate the search for a useable national past 
and a language through which it might be expressed. In the succeeding generation individual patriotic 
intellectuals fuse into a collective social stratum, the intelligentsia, and in Phase B they turn nationalist ideas into a 
social force through their writings, editing newspapers, organizing clubs, leading marches, and teaching, as 
Brzozowski did. 
As an example of the exTraordinary effect of Herder's and other early patriots' ideas on intellectuals in 
various parts of Europe, it is worthwhile examining the case of Finland. Early in the nineteenth century the "Turku 
Romantics" collected Finnish songs and stories, and even though they were themselves Swedish-speakers they 
promoted the language of Finnish-speaking Finns. One of them, Elias Lonnrot, published in 1835 a collection of 
tales he had collected from rural Finns, the Kalevala, which was seen as the epic expression of the early Finns. 
The Kalevala gave the Finns an heroic past and identity and inspired the Fennomania movement which pushed for 
recovery of Finnish culture and language. Fennomen intellectuals organized clubs to speak Finnish and study the 
national epic.Il0 The Russian imperial government, which ruled Finland, also encouraged Finnish-language 
schooling in order to reduce the influence of the Swedish elite in Finland, and in 1863 Finnish was made an 
official language of the Grand Duchy equal to Swedish. A sense of Finnish nation liberated from Swedish cultural 
superiority developed in the conjuncture of three factors: Russian state interests, intellectual activity in forging a 
sense of Finnish identity, and the receptivity of the Finnish-speaking rural population.'" Empowered by a new 
positive identity, the Finnish-spealung Finns became more active politically in the late nineteenth century, 
ultimately forming a mass Social Democratic party alongside smaller, less powerful nationalist and conservative 
parties. In Finland Hroch's Phase C, the stage at which the broad masses become involved in nationalist politics, 
involved not so much a unified allclass national movement but a broad national consensus in favor of autonomy 
(and later independence) for Finland that fractured socially along class lines. Finnish identity over time became 
increasingly anti-Russian, anti-imperial, and in favor of an independent Finnish state, but that independence was 
achieved only after a brief and bloody civil war between Finns of different social ~ lasses ."~  
Hroch's historiographical treatment of intellectuals in small European nations fits reasonably well with a 
more general historical sociological theory of intellectuals as a social stratum initially produced by, and then 
rendered redundant by, a colonial power. Imperial rule both creates the conditions for the education of a native 
intelligentsia and then makes impossible its full development into the effective elite of its own society. This is a 
familiar story that has been told about many places. Benedict Anderson indeed begins his tale of modular 
nationalisms with a similar story of the "Creole pioneers" of South and North America. Local elites, frustrated by 
their stunted "pilgrimages" into the ruling strata of the empire, developed national independence movements 
based, not on ethnicity and culture (which they shared with the metropole), but on borrowed Enlightenment 
principles and on the territoriality that their "pilgrimages" marked out. These American Creoles "constituted 
simultaneously a colonial community and an upper class," "economically subjected and exploited to be sure, but 
able to read the writings of Rousseau and Herder and interpret their existence as essentially separate from the 
metropolitans by virtue of their different climate and "ecology" that they believed "had a constitutive impact on 
culture and ~haracter.""~ Summing up his approach, which has moved the discussion of nationalism from social 
determination to the complexities of cultural construction, and providing an explanation for the particular multiple 
nationalisms based on imperial administrative units, Anderson writes: 
Liberalism and the Enlightenment clearly had a powerful impact, above all in providing an 
arsenal of ideological criticisms of imperial and anciens regitnes. What I am proposing is that 
neither economic interest, Liberalism, nor Enlightenment could, or did, create in thetnselves the 
kind, or shape, of imagined community to be defended from these regimes' depredations; to put it 
another way, none provided the framework of a new consciousness -- the scarcely-seen periphery 
of its vision -- as opposed to centre-field objects of its admiration or disgust. In accomplishing 
this specific task, pilgrim creole functionaries and provincial creole printmen played the decisive 
historic role.Il4 
In a later chapter Anderson continues the story into the period of twentiethcentury anticolonial 
nationalism where once again the administrative unit "came to acquire a national meaning in part because it 
, circumscribed the ascent of creole functionarie~.""~ Here the vanguard role of intelligentsias "derived from their 
bilingual literacy, or rather literacy and bilingualism. Print-literacy already made possible the imagined 
community floating in homogeneous, empty time .... Bilingualism meant access, through the European language- 
of-state, to modem Western culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the models of nationalism, nation- 
ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth cent~ry.""~ Similarly, just as frustrated 
westernized intellectuals tended to be the primary movers in the decolonization efforts that ended overseas 
European empires and created new states in Asia and Africa, in the last years of the Soviet empire, Soviet-trained 
intellectuals were the catalysts in a series of anti-centrist movements for greater autonomy, cultural rights, and 
ultimately independence. Intellectuals in Armenia, Georgia, and the Baltic republics eventually came to power in 
relatively free elections, while in other republics, notably Central Asia and Azerbaijan, established political elites 
managed to crush the fledgling nationalist groupings and transform themselves into the ostensible leaders of the 
nation. Borrowing from the universal discour& of the nation, both anticolonialist intellectuals and state elites 
attempted to make the case for their peoples' right to exist as nations and states, weakening the will of the 
colonizers to maintain the former empires, and enhancing their own claim as the leaders of newly independent 
states. 
Nationalist intellectuals beyond Europe and the Americas introduced the idea of the modem and allied the 
local to the global within their societies. Though they began as relatively isolated groups of intellectuals, 
nationalist movements were able to translate into mass movements with the participation of charismatics like 
Gandhi or in alliance with the military. Intellectual nationalism thus preceded a sense of nationality among the 
population. By articulating forcefully the distinction between the colonized and the colonizer, they fostered a sense 
of the "people-nation." Colonial nationalists rejected the imperial rulers while in admiration of their technology 
and statecraft they adopted their western ways to build a new postcolonial state."' Just as in the earlier Russian 
Revolution, so in the anti-colonial revolutions and the post-Soviet transformations, wherever the transition was 
revolutionary and the former imperial elite was swept aside, intellectuals made their way into the seats of power. 
. With power, however, their identity as intellectuals becomes ever more difficult to maintain; at least it becomes 
increasingly contentious. State power is not, however, the only threat to intellectual distinction. 
INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES 
Commodification is another threat to intellectuals, especially in advanced capitalist societies. In such 
societies, celebrity can overwhelm intellectual work and notoriety can replace the acclaim of the scholarly 
community. To become a "public intellectual" requires some engagement with commodified media, and in so 
doing, the public intellectual risks becoming the media pundit. Intellectuals can themselves be claimed by. 
consumer culture. Zygmunt Bauman writes, 
Consumer culture creates its own, self-sustained and self-sufficient world, complete with its own 
heroes and pace-setters .... Tightly squeezed by the consumer heroes, politicians  nus st behave like 
them -- or perish .... '[N]ewsY is mostly a tool of forgetting, a way of crowding out yesterday's 
headlines from the audience consciousness .... [Wlithin the contest of consumer culture no room 
has been left for the intellectual as legislator."8 
Even in France, a society that accords intellectuals greater distinction than most other advanced capitalist societies, 
intellectual prestige has become increasingly the consequence of media access, which is in turn determined by the 
ease with which their products are commdfied and circulated through media.'Ig Under these circumstances, 
then, intellectuals and the articulation of the nation change. That articulation becomes more difficult to consider 
without considering its increasingly commodified media. 
Intellectual distinction has also receded with the displacement of the general intellectual. ~ a u m a n ' ~ ~  has 
argued that the rationalizing intrusive state of modernity, the nation state, created the space for modern 
intellectuals by inviting them to provide a culture which legitimates that state's intervention into new spheres of 
social life. Once state and culture are so constructed, the general intellectual recedes in importance. Simply put, 
intellectuals retreat to a relatively privileged life of autonomy (the independent intellectual), become the interpreter 
for cultures not represented by the logic of state power (the organic intellectual), or become a servant of 
bureaucratic power (a professional or technocrat). This shift, however, has not made intellectuals irrelevant. 
As Foucault notes, the displacement of the "universal" intellectual, the writer as figurehead, by the 
"specific" intellectual, the specialist, the expert, since the Second World War has not lessened the interest of power 
in the intellectual. With J. Robert Oppenheimer, the atomic scientist who headed the Manhattan Project, Foucault 
writes, "For the first time, the intellectual was hounded by political powers, no longer on account of the general 
discourse wluch he conducted, but because of the knowledge at his disposal: it was at this level that he constituted 
a political threat."'2' The specific intellectua1.i~ "no longer he who bears the values of all, opposes the unjust 
sovereign or his ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave. It is rather he who, along with a 
handful of others, has at his disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it, powers which can either 
benefit or irrevocably destroy life. He is no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist of life and 
death."'22 
Although intellectuals do own certain kinds of knowledge which are variably powerful, they continue to be made 
themselves by social forces beyond their jurisdiction and their effect is magnified or diminished by institutions and 
cultural projects in which they are embedded. The state, after all, was the principal agent behind the making of 
intellectuals like Oppenheimer. It also produced the bounty of elementary particle physicists in 1980s America, 
whose overproduction was a consequence of state investments in higher education and research. This in turn, 
however, was a consequence of an ideology of the nation: the national interest in the Cold War, in which particle 
physics was deemed essential to national security to stay ahead of the Soviet Union's own imagined military 
prowess. And now, without the link to the Cold War and national security, this intellectual specialization has lost 
its clout and its Texas s~percol l ider . '~~ 
Universities are the most immediate institution that simultaneously produces intellectuals and'serves as 
their sanctuary. This institution can provide its resident and incipient intellectuals with the autonomy to define 
their mission and preserve their distinction from a more "interested" pursuit of knowledge stimulated by profit or 
power. This autonomy can be defended on its own grounds, but it also contributes to the public welfare by 
providing an institution from which truth can be spoken to power. Such an institution is important for all 
democratic societies, but it is increasingly dificult to preserve in postcommunist societies where universities and 
other institutions of research and higher education fail to provide the material conditions that enable intellectuals 
to choose "truth" over professional or bureaucratic service. Market research and governmental consulting become 
increasingly lucrative substitutes for intellectual practice. 
In general, universities also are national institutions in which national historiographies and historians are 
produced, and entire specializations or disciplines are cast within a national frame. Within the USA, for instance, 
whole departments of sociology can focus only on its own nation, as if the study of one society were enough to 
produce expertise on societies in general. Departments of political science identify American politics as a 
speciality entirely apart from comparative politics in which the rest of the world is studied. Of course, this kind of 
ethnocentrism is unlikely to be viewed by most Americans as a reflection of the nation's ideological centrality 
much less as an expression of nationalism. That is partly because nationalism in the USA specifically, and in the 
advanced capitalist world generally, tends to be less obvious because it is both more deeply insinuated in the 
reproduction of power, rather than its transformation. It is also attached more directly to those ideologies which 
claim the universality of being on top, rather than in the particularities of resistance. This, however, may be in the 
process of deep transformation. 
As the power of the nation state recedes and as capital and other social relations become more global, '24 
the university itself is likely to be transformed. The globalization of scholarship, scholars and students within 
leading universities of the advanced countries challenge the ways in which these institutions generate national 
visions and national intellectuals.. The more immediate challenge to that national formation of intellectuality, 
however, comes from the proliferation of contest over claims to competence. 
In the United States, cultural wars over the canon of the humanities, over the appropriateness of weapons 
research on university campuses, over affirmative action and over freedom of speech are not just isolated academic 
arguments, but contests that are redefining the relationship between intellectuals, universities and the nation. 
These contests are demonstrating the importance and profundity of a university life guided by academic ideals. 
The losers in these contests are, however, likely to contribute to the delegitimation of the university as intellectual 
sanctuary by claiming that ideology, rather than intellectuality, rules. Familiar epithets like "tenured radicals" or 
"racist administration" and charges of duplicity on all sides help to undermine the notion that intellectuals of 
various inclinations can belong to the same communities of discourse, and that intellectuals can share a culture of 
critical discourse. 
From without, these contests may appear to make intellectuals no different from others motivated by 
ideology, profit or power.. It can lead some, nostalgic for mythological days of a single canon and uncontested 
claims to competence, to question why intellectuals need a different kind of institution to articulate the truth when 
the intellectual distinction is so dubious. Ironically, or perhaps tragically, at the very moment when intellectual 
debate becomes ever more important for rearticulating the nation in the USA, the institution and its defining 
qualities, like tenure, itself are being doubted. And in such times, the challenge to intellectuals may be terrific; for 
in the contest over truth, the very importance of preserving and strengthening such a site may become increasingly 
important. Not only need its autonomy be preserved, for the development of intellectuality as such. It also must 
find a way to exqend its influence when commodified media and corporate or state sponsored knowledge 
overwhelm the public sphere. The university, in these circumstances, becomes an especially important place to 
cultivate the general intellectual as a trans-national community, if not as an individual. If that discourse cannot be 
generated within the university, then it is unlikely to be generated anywhere. 
Intellectuals are significant in the articulation of nations. This is relatively obvious in the modern world 
of newlyemerging states and postcolonial nations where new states attempt to nationalize themselves and 
embryonic nations seek full statehood. There, intellectuals find familiar and obvious work in the codification of 
more pure languages, in the production of histories and future scenaria. Although post-modern conditions in the 
developed capitalist world might reduce the prominence of traditional intellectuals, intellectual powers remain 
potentially quite significant. In order to recognize their powers, however, new theoretical tools must be developed 
to recognize the distinction of a dispersed intellectuality and its potential organization within university settings 
only partially insulated from the circuits of capital, power and ideology that characterize public discourse beyond 
its walls. And as the nation is transformed through processes of globalization, the analysis of this intelletual 
articulation becomes ever more critical. 
We hope this book inspires many more works on intellectuals in the articulation of the nation, for much 
needs to be done. First of all, the variety of ways in which different kinds of intellectuals articulate the nation 
ought to be studied. These articulations need be assessed in different circumstances, in times of rapid social 
transformation, explicit social struggle, quiet resistance and apparent social reproduction. We need not only study 
how intellectuals articulate the nation, but also how the nation articulates intellectuals, as well as how intellectuals 
are embedded in everyday life, institutional arrangements, power relations, and above all, the discourse of the 
nation. If nationalism remains the most powerful of the world's explicit ideologies, then the functions and 
distinctions of intellectuals will be transformed as the nation itself moves from its initial consolidations, to the 
contest over its expression, to its potential transformation by globalization. These questions might be approached 
anywhere, of course, but we focus here on the distinction of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. 
THE DISTINCTION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND EURASIA 
We have this geographical focus not only because the two of us have been specialists in this world region 
and associates of the University of Michigan Center for Russian and-East European Studies. It is also because 
Eastern Europe provides a fertile empirical ground for examples of nationalism and has been disproportionately 
influential in generating theories of both the nation and of the intelligentsia. Consider, for instance, Jeromy 
Karabel's sociological attempt to develop a theory of intellectuals and politics. The following conditions make 
radical intellectual politics more likely: 
1) the presence of well-organized and politically radical subordinate social groups; 2) the absence 
of a strong business class; 3) a high ratio of 'relatively unattached' intellectuals to those 
employed by large scale organizations; 4) the presence of a moderately repressive regime that 
lacks the means and or the will to stamp out dissent; 5) weakness or divisions within the ruling 
group; 6) when the state is unable to protect the 'people' or the 'nation' from economic, political, 
or military encroachments from other states that occupy more powerful positions in the world 
system; 7) the presence of sharp boundaries between social groups, including the boundary 
separating intellectuals from non-intellectuals (i.e. the people); 8) the esistence of historically 
grounded cultural repertoires of resistance to authority.'25 
There are few places in the world which have such a concentration of these conditions as in Eastern Europe and 
the lands comprising the former Soviet Union. And it is in radical politics that the most powerful linkages 
between intellectuals and transformative practices can be found. By using these more dramatic moments as a lens, 
or as a comparative base, theories of intellectuals and politics are typically built, but not without their limitations. 
The relationship between the East European intelligentsia and communist regimes and progressive social 
movements has been the typical focus of sociologists like Karabel and Kennedy who focus on intellectuals and 
power. In this collection we seek to go beyond the particularly problematic relationships between communism and 
intellectuals, and rather focus on what likely complicates that relationship between intellectuals and radical politics 
in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Caucasus: the relation between intellectuals and the nation. Indeed, and 
especially for those scholars who have long focused on the relationship between intellectuals and left politics, we 
find another of Geoff Eley's recent reminders quite useful: that national politics has shaped left politics profoundly 
and not always in such obvious ways that one can leave the relationship unstated. In particular, at the turn of the 
- century, it was difficult to say what nation the intellectuals of the German labor movement were articulating, given 
the "cosmopolitan messiness" of the period.'26 Part of our effort in this volume is to show how the nation is indeed 
"messy," and where it is not, how intellectuals have contributed to fixing its clarity. Indeed, in each of the articles, 
the "fixing" of the nation -- whether in more familiar terms as in defining its menlbership or claims to a state, or in 
less commonly discussed terms, as in relation to matters of democracy, gender and business -- is the object of 
intellectual labor. Thus, one virtue of this region has been that it has several of modernity's powerful ideologies -- 
liberalism, communism and nationalism -- well articulated in opposition to, and in conjunction with each other, 
making the significance of intellectual labor in reformulating them more obvious than they might be in other 
sites.I2' 
We are not only, however, focusing on these ideological labilities. By studying the agents themselves, 
their own social production, we can also explore the making of this intellectual power. We are considering, 
therefore, not just the fixing of messy nations in periods of dramatic social transformation. We also seek those 
more mundane moments, where the "quiet" politics of nation-making are being conducted through intellectual 
labor. Thus we consider how the social conditions and national discourses which envelope intellectuals shape their 
own work, and establish the conditions at least of the production of intellectuals, their articulation, if not also their 
influence. 
Finally, this collection is an attempt to introduce a more nuanced approach to intellectuals and the 
articulation of the nation by considering how the relationship is itself influenced by the gaze of the theorist 
themselves. We wish to suggest the importance of the analyst's conditions of scholarly production in accounts of 
intellectuals and power. Simply put, the power relations in which an analyst is embedded inflect the story of 
intellectuals and power that is told. The story of Emilia Plater in this case can then become exemplary. 
In 1830, Ernilia Plater, subsequently elevated to the pantheon of Polish national heroes, led a regiment of 
' 
men to storm the fortress of Dynaburg. Halina ~ i l i p o w i c z ' ~ ~  compares various ways in which Plater's life was used 
by different intellectuals at different times to emphasize different themes. While some have noted that Plater was 
elevated to that pantheon because Adam Mickiewicz, in his poem, "The Death of a Colonel", found the literary 
device that could install her as hero at a moment of need, Filipowicz writes that Plater's elevation was more deeply 
implicated in a complex politics of class, nation and gender. Her Lithuanian aristocratic status meant her sacrifice 
was all the greater; her wealthy relatives promoted her cause; and her virginity, implied but underplayed in all 
texts, was absolutely central, especially for those of the old Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, in which "her 
inviolate body is a metaphor of moral good as well as an urgent political symbol of national integrity, a projection 
of future restoration and unity".'29 Underlying all of these portraits, however, was an emphasis on her patriotism, 
rather than her challenge to gender hierar~hies.'~' 
Because we wish to highlight the importance of the conditions of scholarly production on the products of 
intellectuals, we have included autobiographical essays of our volume's contributors in this collection. If the social 
production of intellectuals is so important for the articulation of nations, the authors represented in this collection 
are themselves 'nationed' and imprinted with a particular life experience that enables, and constrains, them to 
make the arguments that they do. While short autobiographical statements are hardly adequate to explaining the 
articles written here, they suggest the directions of research we find essential to a theory of "nationed intellectual 
practice". We shall let these autobiagraphical statements more or less represent themselves. In the conclusion, 
however, we shall discuss the essays in order to construct a more positive direction for the analysis of intellectuals 
in the articulation of the nation. We only provide a brief introduction below. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
In the opening essay Alexander J. Motyl challenges the now widely-accepted constructivist view on 
nation-making. Constructivists or modernists, including the editors of this volume, have argued that nations are 
neither primordial, perennial, or natural divisions of humanity but rather the historically contingent and relatively 
recent product of imagination and inventi0.n. Without returning to primordialism, Motyl questions the role of 
elites in the "invention of tradition" and the generation of national identity and emphasizes the collective 
undertakings of ordinary people, those who orally transmit myths and epics, poems and songs, and live the lives 
that contribute the raw material for national identification. 
Khachig Tololyan employs his skills as a literary scholar to illuminate a key early nineteenth-century 
Armenian poem that stands at the point of transition from the selfconception of the Armenian community as 
religious, oppressed, and dispersed, to a proto-national discourse of return, liberation, and restoration. Tololyan's 
story is of a nationalist intelligentsia that operated outside of Ottoman Annenia in the dispersed communities of 
India, Venice, Moscow, Tbilisi, and Constantinople, where "a distant diaspora re-invented, re-imagined, 
reconceived the homeland." Patriotic intellectuals and self-proclaimed liberators constructed a national tradition, 
linking discrete events in the past into a continuous narrative of the nation subject (the subjugated nation) moving 
through history toward emancipation. 
John-Paul Himka enthusiastically embraces the new theoretical openings of the recent nationalism 
literature to examine the contest of identities that Galician Rusyns held in the nineteenth century and explain why 
some identities resonated while others were silenced. Among a people that called themselves "Rus," Galician 
nobles were Polonized, both linguistically and religiously, long before the nineteenth century, and even the first 
generation of "nationalists," the patriotic clerics, had adopted Polish culture. But from Poland they had a template 
of national culture available for application to their own experience. A Russophilic orientation competed with a 
weak Belorussian alternative, but religion prevented full merger with the Catholic Polesor the Orthodox Russians. 
Himka's explanation for the potentency of a Ukrainian identity by the early twentieth century is historically 
contextualized in the politics of the Austrian state, the preferences of the local church, and the intense competition 
betwein Ukrainophile and Russophile intellectuals. 
Yuri Slezkine uses the figure of Nikolai Man, the dean of early Soviet linguists, .to show how a powerfidly 
, placed intellectual not only established a unique pedigree for his mother language but more grandly attempted to 
solve the "Ethnological Predicament" (the missing symmetry among language, nation, state, and territory) with an 
elaborate classificatory system. Here authority was conferred by a discourse of science and the imprimatur of the 
Soviet state, possessor of or at least arbiter of truth. Man's work began in tsarist Russia, but it was with the 
empowerment of loyal intellectuals by the Soviets and in the context of the collaboration of intellectuals in the 
generation of a particular Soviet Marxism that Man's linguistics took its final shape. But Man's "final solution of 
the Great Ethnological Predicament proved temporary." (p. 40) Scholars and state officials picked away at his 
theories until in 1950 the question of the relation of language to social base was "resolved by Stalin himself. 
While Marr was the quintessential establishment intellectual during his later life, Antonio Gramsci and 
Dimitris Glinos were, in Janet Hart's phrase "civil intellectuals" who combined critical thinking with political 
activity, like the Russian intellinenty of the nineteenth century, to save their nations from perceived disaster. 
Reading closely their letters and articles, Hart explores the "paralanguage" of the nation that lies behind the more 
explicit expression of politics. Deeply imbedded in the work of these revolutionary intellectuals was a commitment _ 
to "generativity," the inspiration and education of young people to carry on the national revolutionary cause. 
Andrzej Walicki is critical of the rush by scholars to imagination and invention as the primary forms of 
nation-making. His own historical narrative proposes an alternation between moments of ethnic consolidation, as 
in medieval Poland, and intellectual reconceptualization, as in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Contests 
. . 
over conceptions of the nation marked the politics and high culture of Poland through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, but, he maintains, ultimately intellectuals only can imagine a nation on "a firm ethnic basis." 
Katherine Verdery explores a dynamic moment just after the fall of the Communist regime in Rumania 
when politicians, dissidents, and other intellectuals competed over definitions of the nation and its connection to 
Europe. Focusing on the "political economy of symbolism," she weighs the relative power of different 
conceptualizations and finds that more inclusive, multinational models or borrowed notions of "civil society" fail to 
resonate as loudly as the master symbol of "the nation" conceived more ethnically. But the opposition of the nation 
to notions of a liberal civil society does not exhaust the complex interrelationship of liberalism and nationalism. 
As Michael D. Kennedy shows, both liberalism and nationalism are labile ideologies, internally 
discordant discourses in which the very understanding of liberalism requires the understanding of the nation and 
vice versa. Kennedy extends the category of intellectual to include articulate Polish businessmen who self- 
consciously cultivate images of and play the functional role of more traditionallyconceived intellectuals. Their 
business activity is involved in the articulation of a new Polish nation, now imbricated in the global networks of 
liberalism, democracy, and capitalism. 
Originating in a lecture series on Ethnopolitics and Culture proposed by Ron Suny, this volume reflects 
the theme developed by him, Michael Kennedy, and Zvi Gitelman at the Center for Russian and East European 
Studies at the University of Michigan in 1993 and 1994. Funded by the University of Michigan's Council on 
International Academic Affairs, the series was administered by Donna Parmelee, whose contribution was 
invaluable. The editors are grateful to the University, the Center, their colleagues, the University of Michigan 
Press, its external reviewers and our editor Susan Whitlock, not to mention the series' participants, for all their 
work and advice. Without their effort and help, this volume would not have come together. We also wish to thank 
Liz, Emma, Lucas, Armena, Sevan and Anoush, for without their support, we could never find the spirit and time 
to complete this volume. Thank you. 
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